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Patient Treatment and Terminating Life: 
An Ethical Opinion 
Patrick J. Coffey 
The author, an associate professor of philosophy at Marquette Uni-
versity in Milwaukee, received his doctorate from St. Louis University 
in 1967. He will shortly assume the position of book review editor of 
Linacre Quarterly. 
Can it ever be morally appropriate for a physician to treat a patient 
professionally by inducing a lethal agent into his or her body? Or, to 
put that question generally, can the direct and immediate termination 
of a patient's life ever be a morally appropriate mode of treatment in 
the practice of medicine? The professional oaths, declarations, and 
official statements made throughout the long history of medicine 
indicate that the consistent public response of many physicians to the 
question has been negative. 1 The Hippocratic Oath, for example, 
states rather explicitly that the physician will not give a deadly drug to 
any patient. 2 A similar statement on this point was made recently by 
the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association. 
The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another-
mercy killing - is contrary to that for which the medical profession stands 
and is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association. 
One of the most significant reasons for the long-standing opposition 
of the medical profession to patient termination would seem to be the 
apparent incompatibility between its humane goals and any kind of 
treatment which directly causes death. Preserving health and com-
batting or controlling disease have always been included among those 
goals, but death is the ultimate term of a diseased and unhealthy state. 
Thus, it appears that a physician would be acting contrary to the 
interests of his profession were he to induce a lethal agent into a 
patient's body. 
Yet, despite the unambiguous public stance of the medical profes-
sion on patient termination, the question raised about it at the begin-
ning of this paper is currently a concern in medical ethics because of 
the interest that has developed in recent years, particularly among 
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some specialists in that field, in having active euthanasia listed among 
the morally appropriate forms of patient treatment. 3 These ethicists 
admit that preservation of health and control of disease are proper 
professional goals of medicine, but they deny that any incompatibil-
ity necessarily exists between these goals and a physician's act of 
injecting a lethal agent into a patient's body. Two principal arguments 
have been advanced in recent philosophical literature to support this 
contention. In the first of these to be considered in the paper, the 
argument develops by showing the lack of a moral distinction between 
withholding or withdrawing life support or terminal disease-con-
trolling therapy from a patient, thereby allowing the patient to die, 
and actively putting a patient to death. Based upon the lack of this 
distinction and the admission generally made by the medical profes-
sion, as well as by the public community, that it is moral at times for a 
physician to withhold or withdraw life support or terminal disease-
controlling therapy for humane reasons, the argument then concludes 
that it can also be morally appropriate for a physician to terminate the 
life of a patient in this sort of context, if humane reasons exist to 
warrant the termination. 
Tl.'e bare difference between k illing and letting die does not, in itself, make 
a moral difference. If a doctor lets a patient die , for humane reasons, he is in 
the same position as if he had given a patient a lethal injection for humane 
reasons. If his decision was wrong - if, for example the patient's illness was 
in fact curable - his decision would be equally regrettable no matter what 
method was used to carry it out. And if the doctor's decision was the right 
one, the method used in itself is not important. 4 
The argument of James Rachel is, I believe, generally recognized to 
be the strongest defense for the position made thus far. The core of 
Rachel's argument consists in an illustration of the apparent lack of 
any significant moral distinction between "allowing a person to die" 
and "putting a person to death" in two similar cases.5 In the first case 
it is stipulated that Smith will gain a large inheritance if his six year 
old nephew dies. To facilitate that end, Smith drowns the child while 
the latter is taking a bath, and arranges to make what happened look 
like an accident. In the second case it is stipulated that Jones will gain 
a large inheritance if his six year old nephew dies. To facilitate that 
end, Jones intends to drown the child during the latter's bath. When 
about to carry out his plan, however, Jones finds that his nephew has 
slipped, hit his head on the bathtub, and is already in the process of 
drowning. The child, then drowns "accidentally" as Jones watches and 
does nothing. In reference to these cases Rachel's argument offers the 
following analysis to support his contention that no morally signifi-
cant distinction exists between "allowing to die" and "putting to 
death." 
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Now Smith killed the child , wh ereas Jones 'merely' let the child die. That is 
the only diffe rence between them. Did e ither man behave better, from a 
moral point of view? If the difference between killing and letting die were in 
itsel f a morall y important m atter, one should say that Jones' behavior was 
less reprehensible than Smith's. But does one really want to say that? I 
think not. 6 
Rachel's argument, however, involves some serious problems. Al-
though his cases show that any morally significant distinction between 
"allowing to die" and "putting to death" is not apparent in those 
situations where the pertinent agent is as guilty for not saving a victim 
whose death he intends, as he would have been for killing the victim 
outright, the illustration shows no more than that. The apparent lack 
of Jistinction in the two cases also might be explained, for example, 
by one's overall perception of the following facts in the cases rather 
than by any real lack of moral significance between the omission and 
the commission: the same intention of the agent to kill the victim in 
each case, the same end result in each case - death, and a clear and 
significant moral failure in each case - a failure in justice in the killing 
case and failure in beneficence in the "not saving" case. Secondly, 
Rachel's cases really tell nothing about what moral significance be-
tween "allowing to die" and "putting to death " might be revealed in 
the context where the physician is acting morally in allowing his 
patient to die. In this context the physician is without moral guilt in 
letting his patient die, but in Rachel's illustration Jones is morally 
guilty for not saving the child from drowning. The fact that Jones was 
as guilty for not saving his nephew as he would have been had he 
actually killed him tells us nothing about how the direct termination 
of life is going to contrast with "allowing to die" in a medical context 
. wherein the latter is clearly morally permissible. And, as indicated by 
Tom Beauchamp,S a moral distinction between omission and commis-
sion may well be shown from this context, since any direct termina-
tion of life there removes all possibility of life for the patient, but 
withholding or withdrawing life support or terminal disease control-
ling therapy need not do this, as the Karen Quinlan case clearly shows. 
Basis of Second Argument 
The second of the arguments advanced to justify the inclusion of 
patient termination in patient treatment is based upon the nature and 
function of the therapy used to serve the other goals of medicine in 
addition to those of preserving health and controlling disease, namely 
the goals of alleviating a patient's pain and comforting his suffering. 
The signers of "A Plan for Beneficent Euthanasia,"9 for example, 
point out that a physician taking the Hippocratic Oath is committed 
both to the treatment and cure of disease and to the relief of suffer-
ing, and that the physician's primary concern in the terminal stages of 
incurable illness should be the relief of suffering. Thus they contend 
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that it is cruel and barbarous to require that a person be kept alive 
against his will and to deny his pleas for merciful release after the 
dignity, beauty, promise, and memory of life have vanished, and the 
individual is left to linger on in stages of agony or decay. 
As already noted, there is general agreement among ordinary citi-
zens as well as medical professionals that patients can and do exist in 
contexts where initiating or continuing life support or terminal disease 
controlling therapy will be of no benefit, and may even be harmful. 
Unambiguous contexts of this type, for example, might be those 
wherein a patient's capacity to continue developing his personal his-
tory, or to begin to develop it as in the case of infants, is virtually 
rendered permanently impotent by the disease or illness,lO or possibly 
by the medication necessary for controlling it. It seems clear that the 
goals of me,dicine to preserve health and control disease can no longer 
be effectively achieved in these cases. Thus, the only professional and 
moral obligation a physician can possibly have in attending to this 
kind of patient is to comfort the patient in his suffering and attempt 
to alleviate his pain, i.e., the physician's only moral obligation is to 
administer a "caring therapy." The question pertinent to the paper 
which arises here, then, is this: could a physician morally fulfill his 
professional responsibility to care for a terminally ill patient for whom 
health-preserving or disease-controlling therapy is no longer warranted 
by inducing a lethal agent into that patient's body? I can find no good 
logical reason for denying that it could be morally appropriate for a 
physician to give a lethal drug dosage to a patient of the type we have 
been discussing if the following conditions are present in the patient's 
context: 1) the dosage to be administered is necessary for alleviating 
intolerable and irreversible pain, 2) administering it is compatible with 
the ordinary medical procedures for pain-alleviating therapy (e.g., the 
drug administered is a pain-killing drug), 3) the patient concurs, 
explicitly or clearly by implication, to the procedure. Termination 
made under these conditions would simultaneously serve medicine's 
desirable goal of pain-alleviation in a way consistent with normal med-
ical procedures for alleviating pain. Furthermore, termination under 
these conditions cannot possibly violate medicine's goals of control-
ling disease and preserving health, since these goals cannot be achieved 
within the context of the patient in question. 
Absolute objections to any inclusion of patient termination in 
patient treatment, including the rather limited one just suggested, have 
been made most often from theological arguments and the empirical 
form of the wedge argument. These theological arguments generally 
contend that the direct killing of a patient for any reason would 
necessarily cause the physician to violate a fundamental relation exist-
ing between God and man, in which God alone is understood to have 
absolute dominion over innocent human life)2 The empirical form of 
the wedge argument generally supports a utilitarian type thesis: any 
300 Linacre Quarterly 
inclusion of patient termination in patient treatment would cause 
society to weaken its general moral defense against killing and ulti-
mately have the undesirable consequence of encouraging and per-
mitting termination in all sorts of unwarranted cases. 
If, for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is not 
implausible to suppose that destroying defective unborns (a form of invol· 
untary euthanasia) would become a common and accepted practice, that as 
population increases occur the aged will even be more neglectable and neg· 
lected than they are now, that capital punishment for a wide variety of 
crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would have 
appreciably reduced fears of injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed propi· 
tious to do so, and that the laws or war against killing would erode in 
efficacy even beyond their already abysmal level. 13 
Insofar as the objection to any direct killing in a theological argu-
ment is defended by a line of reasoning which rests ultimately on a 
religious faith belief, as frequently occurs, little damage is done to the 
argument for patient termination made above. A theological claim of 
this sort may be required of physicians who share the pertinent faith 
belief, but it is not, nor should one expect it to be, a compelling claim 
for any reasonable physician who simply takes morality seriously. Fur-
thermore, in regard to the type of theological objection to direct 
termination which rests on purely philosophical argumentation, the 
history of philosophy shows rather clearly the difficulty one encoun-
ters in attempting to delineate through reason alone the precise rela-
tionship which obtains between human creatures and their Creator. To 
my knowledge, no compelling philosophical argument of this kind has 
been developed that any reasonable physician could be expected to 
accept (i.e., who, in not accepting the argument, would necessarily be 
either stupid or ill-willed). 
Turning now to the empirical form of the wedge argument, one 
difficulty with it is that its objections to any patient termination often 
lack sufficient empirical evidence to be convincing. The horrendous 
genocide resulting from the national euthanasia policy of Nazi Ger-
many is, for example, the most significant piece of empirical evidence 
many recent wedge arguments use in making their objection; but does 
that evidence really indicate what unwarranted liberties with human 
life a physician functioning in a civilized society would take, if it were 
admitted that the termination of a patient's life in the process of 
pain-alleviating therapy could be morally permissible? 
Difficulty with Wedge Objections 
A second and related difficulty with wedge argument objections is 
that they are often based, at least partially, upon gratuitous assump-
tions about how the perverse tendencies in human beings will become 
unleashed if patient termination is considered moral. In defending his 
objection Joseph Sullivan, for example, states that "once the respect 
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for human life is so low that an innocent person may be killed directly 
even at his own request, compulsory euthanasia will necessarily be 
very near." 14 The text from Tom Beauchamp's study cited previously 
in the paper is also full of gratuitous assumptions of this kind. The 
critical issue here then is why anyone inclined to favor the inclusion of 
patient termination in patient treatment should take seriously any 
objections to that leaning based upon gratuitous assumptions. More-
over, are there really any substantive reasons for believing that physi-
cians would unjustly kill their patients, were patient termination 
deemed morally acceptable in the process of pain-alleviating therapy, 
any more than they currently unjustly withhold life support or dis-
ease-controlling treatment from their patients? No doubt some injus-
tice exists in current practices of withholding and withdrawing, espe-
cially in cases involving infants, but few people advocate correcting 
this abuse by eliminating the permissibility of withholding and with-
drawing in patient treatment. Even if it is true, as some ethicians 
suggest,15 that no form of patient termination should be sanctioned 
at this time, either in law or in professional medical codes of ethics, 
because of the possible harm that might result, it does not deny the 
theoretical point established previously: a physician could be acting 
morally in inducing a lethal agent into a terminally ill patient's body 
during the process of caring therapy, when that is the only form of 
patient treatment warranted in the context.16 Nevertheless, this 
theoretical point may in itself have little practical relevance for patient 
treatment. Medical institutions dedicated to serving terminally ill 
patients, such as the famous St. Christopher's Hospice in London, 
England, seem to be able to administer caring therapy to their dying 
patients in a satisfactory manner without being required to terminate 
their lives. In fact, Cicely Saunders, an internationally respected physi-
cian and director of St. Christopher's, reports that "in treating pa-
tients much pain can be relieved without resorting to analgesics at 
all." 17 
Yet, if the argument for patient termination in the context of pain-
alleviating therapy is theoretically substantive, it does raise the inter-
esting query of whether justification for patient termination in patient 
treatment can be made in contexts other than the one involving pain-
alleviating therapy. 18 It can be readily denied, I believe, that any other 
justification for patient termination can be made in any context 
involving conscious patients. Since the goals of medicine properly 
direct physicians to care for their patients as well as to preserve their 
health and control their disease, whenever that is possible and bene-
ficial, physicians would seem to have a professional obligation to con-
tinue administering caring therapy to any conscious patient, even 
when a patient can no longer benefit from disease-controlling therapy. 
An objection to this exclusion made by Daniel Maguire states that 
"persons who are quite accessible to human caring might, in spite of 
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their accessibility, find good reasons to prefer death to continued 
living." 19 In fact, Maguire argues, "the care they might want is assist-
ance in hastening death." 20 If, however, it is true, as Maguire's state-
ment implies, that a physician can no longer have a moral obligation 
to continue administering caring therapy to a dying patient who 
refuses treatment, although the person is accessible to the therapy, it 
must also be true that caring therapy by its nature requires the pa-
tient's acceptance in order to exist at all. Thus, the physician cannot 
really have any professional obligations to a patient in this context 
and, as a physician, cannot have any moral reason or justification for 
terminating the person's life. Maguire's contextual position seems to 
suggest that the goals of medicine are pragmatic goals, which have 
developed in the manner of a typical producer-consumer process. The 
history of medicine, however, does not support the suggestion. Medi-
cine's professional goals of preserving health, controlling disease, and 
administering care to patients have remained constant throughout 
medicine's long history primarily because they relate to important 
human goods, and not because they fulfill the wishes or desires of 
individual patients, regardless of the value or disvalue that will result 
from the fulfillment. 21 
The remaining context where additional justification for patient 
termination in patient treatment might possibly be made, then, is one 
involving a self-respirating but irreversibly comatose patient for whom 
disease-controlling therapy is no longer warranted. It seems clear that 
some sort of therapy would still be professionally required for any 
other comatose patient context, whether the coma is or is not rever-
sible. Can it be morally permissible then, for a physician to inject a 
lethal agent into the body of an irreversibly comatose patient who 
continues to self-respirate? Prescinding from the absolute injunctions 
against any form of patient termination reviewed and evaluated 
earlier, perhaps the best reason for answering this question negatively 
might be that the person in the comatose context under consideration 
continues to be a genuine medical patient; he can be fed, his waste can 
be removed and, in addition to other similar things, his bed position 
can be changed periodically. Thus no termination can possibly be 
warranted for this type of patient because he continues to be a viable 
recipient of caring therapy. The plausible objection that can be made 
against this line of reasoning, however, is that the self-respirating 
comatose individual should not be considered a patient in the strong 
sense of the term because he necessarily and permanently is com-
pletely indifferent to anything being done to or for him, and some 
marginal response or realistic hope of a marginal response from the 
patient is necessary for caring therapy to exist at all. How, for 
example, can comfort and pain alleviation be administered to a patient 
who neither feels pain nor suffers discomfort? In what sense is a 
person being treated as a patient if the treatment is administered to his 
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biological body alone?22 But if this is true, then it seems that the 
self-respirating irreversibly comatose patient is simply beyond receiv-
ing patient treatment in any professional sense, and a physician would 
have no more moral justification for terminating the life of this kind 
of person than he has for terminating the life of the conscious patient 
discussed earlier in the paper who is accessible to caring therapy, but 
desires termination instead. 
If the arguments in the paper are substantive then a physician could 
act morally when injecting a lethal dosage of a pain-alleviating drug 
into a terminally ill patient's body during the process of caring ther-
apy. This allowance, however, would seem to have little practical sig-
nificance for the actual practice of patient treatment, since pain gen-
erally appears to be controllable in caring therapy without requiring 
lethal drug dosages. Patient termination then, is not necessarily incom-
patible with patient treatment, but it virtually continues to be unwar-
ranted in medical practice. 
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